to work for any master who, after notice to discharge, should continue to employ any workman who was not a union member, or who had broken any union by-laws and not paid a sum to the society as penalty; and that by means of this agreement they compelled Wait to discharge Home. The first count charged a bare agreement; the second added its effect on Home; the other three merely varied the description of intention to conform with the formula of Serjeant Hawkins [see Nelles, supra note 1, at 196], the third and fourth stating it as to "impoverish" Home "by indirect means," the fifth to "impoverish" Wait, Blanchard, Howard and divers other employers unknown. See Commonwealth v. Hunt, supra note 7, 4 Metc. at 112, 113, 114, 115. The indictment is more fully set forth there than in THACHER. Society21 and the "oppression" of Jeremiah Horne and his employer Isaac Wait. There was no definite evidence that Home had suffered otherwise than in his feelings.22 Wait testified that though he "did not a Rantoul's papers include a pamphlet copy of this constitution, stated on the title page to have been adopted Oct. 12, 1835 and printed in 1837. Thacher's report prints extracts.
The preamble recites that "we, the journeymen bootmakers of Boston, believing it to be a duty incumbent upon us to adopt some measures in connection with our brother craftsmen of other cities and towns, in order to maintain that rate of wages which is necessary to insure us the necessaries of life, and believing too, that concentration of feeling and action is indispensable in effecting our wishes, do adopt the following constitution, pledging ourselves to be governed by and to support it in all its bearings; provided always, in so doing, we do not act in opposition to the laws of this commonwealth."
The most important provisions in relation to the case were those of Article 14: "Any member working for a Society shop, and knowing a journeyman to be at work for the same who is not a member of this society, shall immediately give notice to the other journeymen, who, on receiving such information, shall quit work for that shop; provided, such shop shall have a majority of society men on work, but if their number be less, they may continue until work can be obtained elsewhere."
In "Art. 17 [The Society shall not be dissolved while five members wish it to continue; should it be reduced to ten, a member who wishes it dissolved may call a special meeting; but if five wish it to continue, he shall be fined $2.00.] 495 leave, 5 oppressive men will hold on out of 500!" 2 He was not permitted to testify; see note 25, infra. There was no evidence that he found employment harder to get than formerly, or took lower wages, except that Rantoul notes that Dennis testified Jere "could get no employment." feel at liberty to employ any but society men," because he "would not wish to lose five or six good workmen for the sake of one," he "had not been injured or impoverished"; that wages fixed by the society were not "unreasonably high" and "the society men were all good workmen."23 The efforts of the prosecution to present the Home episode as part of a pernicious series of oppressions by the Society were not strikingly impressive.24
Thacher omits this-probably because it was shown to be untrue. Wait was not asked whether Horne was a good workman. Rantoul Rantoul, true to professional conventions, made it as hard as he could for Parker to put in his evidence. Jeremiah Horne was excluded from testifying upon the ground that he was an atheist.25 The constitution of the Society went in evidence over objection that its connection with the defendants, whose membership was not conceded, had not been shown.26 The prosecution probably gained more than the defense from [a defendant] gave me a written notice. I discharged the society men; I thought I would try how it would operate. Found Rimmen and son could not do my [work] . I advised them to join. They did. I had to discharge Strickland because they would not work [ Rimmen, Cleary and Dennis Home testified that each paid fifty cents initiation fee, signed a list or constitution, and was given a book. Other journeymen had no memory or claimed privilege against self-crimination when asked about signing or receiving a book. The pamphlet copy of the constitution identified by Dennis Horne as that which "they" gave him was received in evidence. There was doubtless testimony, though Rantoul's notes do not show that it was complete, that each of the defendants was present and active at meetings. such tactics; Rantoul notes this as one of the major themes of the District Attorney's summing up: "The shyness of admitting the fact is in wonderful contrast to the pretense that it is lawful."
One of Rantoul's unsuccessful objections to the form of testimony by witnesses for the prosecution was aimed deeper than his merely obstructive technicalities. This was the question to which his test objection was overruled: "Do you feel yourself at liberty to employ or hire any person you please, whether a member of the society or not?"27 The district attorney was allowed directly to ask for, and the witnesses to state, the conclusion that the Society's acts were coercive.8 Much, to be sure, could be said in favor of a law of evidence which would allow at a trial complete license to paint pictures in full color. Our theory that testimony must not include reactions to things seen and heard does not work. A competent trial lawyer not only can, but practically must-it is one of the skills his wage scale depends upon-deliberately violate and evade the prohibitive rules. And the by-play incident to demands for their enforcement often-perhaps usually-results in making partisan inferences and their connotations more contagious to jurors than if their expression had not been dramatized by a leap at or through inefficient obstacles. For the juror's sympathy is with free expression; fact to him is not drab fact, but fact with the natural color imparted by his own interest and emotion. He sees himself in the place of the lawyer or witness who does not want to falsify in neutral language. The most drastic enforcement of the rules fails to blot out color spilled upon the fact picture before the rules can be invoked. But though such enforcement of the rules as is possible is insufficient to make them effective, to overrule objection to a particular violation is to magnify its power to make partisan feelings contagious. When, as in the bootmakers' trial, the court officially sanctions chromatic testimony, the juror is likely to feel that truth and justice have defeated an effort to obstruct them. It was true, of course, that the employers and journeymen who so testified had been "compelled" by the Society to comply with its demands.
27 From Rantoul's copy of the bill of exceptions (the files of the Supreme Judicial Court which would include the official copy are said by the Clerk of that court no longer to exist): "2nd. Elias P. Blanchard, a master bootmaker in Boston, was sworn and examined as a witness for the prosecution; and to the following question which was put to him by Mr. Parker for the Commonwealth, 'Do you feel yourself at liberty to employ or hire any person you please, whether a member of the society or not?' (meaning the society which was alleged to constitute a conspiracy), Mr. Rantoul objected, on the ground that it called for the opinion of the witness in a matter where, by no rule of law, such opinion could be given in evidence. But the Judge overruled the objection and the witness, in answer to the question, said 'that he did not.' To which ruling of the court, and evidence of the witness, defendants entered their exception, and the same was allowed." 28 See testimony of Wait and Howard in THACHER, at 615-16, and of Augustus and Rimmen, supra note 24. Under Fiske, Rantoul has "A man brought me a paper or rates, and compelled me to sign it." But such words as "compel" and "coerce" connote unlawfulness. The tendency of the ruling which gave to conclusions of coercion the status of primary evidential facts was to eliminate from the case the question whether the coercion in which the society had indubitably engaged was justifiable.
No substantial issue was on trial unless that was. And the court did not consistently exclude evidence relevant to it. Half a dozen masters called by the defense strengthened points that Rantoul had commenced making on cross-examination of those called by the prosecution; all testified that they had been benefited by the Society; work was much better in quality than before the Society was organized; the men were steadier and "blue Mondays" had become infrequent; the wages fixed by the Society were moderate, and non-members as well as members could get them; only a few comparatively large shops29 were closed against non-members-who, if they were competent workmen, got employment in the smaller shops as easily and on the same terms as members, the Society raising no objection and making no trouble. To show that association for the promotion, inevitably coercive, of common interests is normal and proper, Rantoul called representatives of several professional and commercial organizations-the closest analogue being that of the Boston Bar, of which Judge Thacher, the District Attorney, Attorney-General Austin, Chief Justice Shaw and Daniel Webster were members. Its rules fixed minimum fees "as the lowest which we can reasonably and honorably receive," and forbade members "to advise or consult, or be in any manner associated" with any non-member attorney who should not have subscribed to its rules. The Boston Medical Association had somewhat similar rules, and in addition a disciplinary committee at whose instance a physician had been expelled for associating with "scabs."30 The Bar Association had dissolved itself in 1836-a time of excitement with respect to the Trades' Union31-and the prosecution contended that its successor organization was merely nominal; but Rantoul could argue that it merely substituted an equally efficacious gentlemen's agreement for formally definite obligations.32 2No shop was very large. The masters who were not free to employ nonmembers were Wait, employing more than 6, Blanchard 10 or 12, Howard 5 to 8, Fiske 12 to 20. Those who hired whom they pleased were Whitney 2, Leach 6 to 8, Field 2, Tyler 1 to 2, Smith 3 to 5, Schaier 2, Dunham 3. As to his own witnesses Rantoul's notes add nothing of consequence to what appears in THACHER, at 619-620. 30 Cf. the Board of Judges provided for by the constitution, supra note 21. There was no evidence that this board existed or functioned.
31 See infra, text above n. 88-97. 3 According to Rantoul's notes the constitution of the later bar association expressed "an opinion that the following rates are proper" instead of expressly making it obligatory not to charge less. The range of its provision that members might be expelled for "ungentlemanly" conduct would seem at least as broad as that of the bootmakers' requirement that members be of "approved moral character." Though this much evidence upon the question of justification was received without question, the court excluded other evidence which was equally relevant if that question was in the case. The legitimacy of the object announced in the preamble to the Society's constitution was not challenged:-"to maintain the rate of wages necessary to insure us the necessaries of life." But when Rantoul, to support argument that its organization and subsequent activities were reasonably necessary to effectuate that object, offered to prove the cost of living at the time of its organization, Judge Thacher ruled that the cost of living was irrelevant.33
The main arguments of counsel and the judge's charge will be outlined later. Except for these, the foregoing covers all that is collectible of what, in the court room, was put before the jurors who found the defendants guilty. Of course the case was tried out of court as well as in. The presidential campaign which resulted in the defeat of Van Buren by Harrison and Tyler was at its highest intensity. At the beginning of his closing argument the district attorney expressed the wish that the trial could have been delayed a month-until after election? Rantoul's notes of the last day of trial contain also the following: , for the Commonwealth, objected, that the indictment did not allege against the defendants any charge of conspiracy for raising their wages, and therefore that the inquiry was wholly irrelevant to the issue of the trial. Mr. Rantoul, in answer to this objection, stated that it was shown by the preamble to the constitution of the society which had been read in evidence and is to be referred to as on file in any future proceedings in this or in the Supreme Judicial Court, that the object of the defendants, who were members of the same, in its formation, was to maintain that rate of wages which was necessary to assure to them the necessaries of life; and he contended that this was the true and only object of the association. Hence he inferred that it was competent for the defendants in their defence to go into the inquiry as to what was, at that time, the price of flour and of the other necessaries of life. But the Judge ruled that the prices of the necessaries of life were not relevant to the issue and therefore excluded the evidence. To which ruling of the Court the defendants entered their exceptions, and the same were allowed."
In an opinion supporting this ruling the trial judge said that "as the defendants are not charged with conspiring to raise their wages" evidence of relation of wages to cost of living which "might be pertinent" (as showing justification?) to that charge was irrelevant. "Whether the object of the club was good or bad, can derive no light from an inquiry into the price of flour .... One crime [raising wages?] can be no justification for another." THACHER, at 638.
No confident conjecture as to the remarks in question results from a search of the Boston papers. All but the Post were ardently Whig, and their slant and emphasis were favorable to the prosecution. The Post's initial reaction had been similar; its brief item on October 9th stated that an indictment had been found against the bootmakers, and that their constitution subjected workmen who declined invitation to join their society to two dollars fine; "This is levying blackmail with a vengeance," was the comment. The Post of October 16th announced that "we have taken means to secure a report of the trial, for the purpose of publication, when closed." The item continues:
"We ought to state that the apparently obnoxious provision in the constitution of the bootmakers' society, upon which a censuring comment was made when the case was first mentioned in our report, has been completely misunderstood in consequence of a misprint in the article as it appears in the pamphlet."
The "misprint" explanation was disingenuous.34 The true ground of the Post's rescission of its censorious construction was probably the fact that so important a Democrat as Rantoul represented the defendants. The Post's promised report of the trial was published October 21st, after the evidence had closed, but before the case had gone to the jury. Though the Post gave more space to the defense and less to the prosecution than the Whig Advertiser, its report was objective; neither there nor in any of its briefer items except the early one above quoted did I note anything which the district attorney could have found useful or objectionable.
The Advertiser's detailed report was not published until the trial was over. It had this in conclusion: "As this trial has apparently created some political feelings, it may be proper to remark that the jury was composed of gentlemen of both political parties." ceased to be a member.36 After he had left court and, it was said, had fortified himself with drink, a non-member named Dowling reproached him for interfering with what was none of his business. Fisticuffs followed; Sculley had Dowling arrested, but later entered a nol. pros.37 II The initial reaction of most Bostonians of native stock such as composed the jury38 was probably like that of the Post. Even in those who were party Democrats39 the dominant political feeling would naturally have been repugnance to Irish40 coercion of American masters to discharge workmen with whom they were satisfied. This feeling was doubtless heightened and rationalized by the district attorney's arguments and the judge's charge. Rantoul to be sure was always heard with attention upon any subject at whatever length he spoke. But it is unlikely that his arguments shook even momentarily the initial presumption of jurors as to the mandate of their Americanism.
At least from the early moment of the trial when the court held that the defendants' needs had no bearing upon the criminality of their Society, it must have been evident to him that his one hope lay in the power of the jury to judge law as well as fact-a power then still, though grudgingly, conceded to be rightful. doubt that conviction that this was true was the main motive of Rantoul's exertions. He came no nearer to stating it, however, than when he claimed that the moving purpose of the defendants' organization-to maintain wages high enough to assure them the necessaries of lifeinvolved negation of the alleged purpose to oppress Home and Wait. He himself saw that this was unsatisfactory.43 But no lawyer of his time could have conceived that the policy question was legal. Had he argued that labor power strong enough to minimize labor sufferings in the competitive scramble is justified by its social usefulness, even though a sufficient power cannot be maintained without restricting the freedom of masters or of an occasional Jeremiah Home, he would have seemed guilty of professional impropriety.
For no Holmes had as yet seen rights and wrongs as relative, or the boundaries between the lawful and the unlawful as broad penumbra. Every legal right or wrong had, conceptually, the sharp definition of day or night in the tropics, where no twilight connects them. In the sphere of torts and crimes, law was thought of as a body of prohibitions; whatever was not forbidden was lawful. The prohibitions were established, settled, known. They had been established by the consent of the governed. The governed had consented to no delegation of legislative power; they kept it in their own hands, even though they necessarily exercised it through representatives. The agency of the courts was merely to enforce known laws; judicial legislation would be tyranny. Though all rightful power was bounded by the common good, that good required above all else that only the established, settled, and known be given effect as law; for otherwise society would incur the greatest of all evils, arbitrary power. Established rules must therefore be given effect, whatever the cost in social disadvantage.44 Argument of their inexpediency should be addressed not to courts but to legislatures. The legal question was always, what is the rule, never what rule would be for the common good. Though a supposed social advantage was often the horse with which a sagacious judge or advocate made his technical arguments move, it was necessary to hitch that horse behind, not before, the cart of legalism. This necessity often excluded one side of a case from presenting its considerations of social advantage. For a court did not have to weigh them. And unless the mind of the court were more 43 On a slip of scratch paper among his notes he wrote that a proper main object is not necessarily exclusive of incidental unlawful objects. 44It is to be noted that Marshall, the most legislative of judges, always represented his constructions as compelled by the plain meaning and intent of constitutional provisions-as evinced, open than minds usually are, considerations which the court preferred not to weigh were apt to be treated as contraband.
Benthamite realists, of whom Rantoul was one, dissented not at all from the conventional ideals. They dissented vehemently, however, from orthodox assumption that these ideals were realized in practice. Recognizing that society is actually regulated less by common consent than by superior power,45 most of them demanded that the greatest number vest themselves with superior power, and restrict the courts to ministry of known rules established by the greatest number for their greatest good. The actuality and variability of the judicial legislation which Rantoul found palpable in law46 did not lead him, as it has modern realists, to urge that legal uncertainty be conceded as inevitable, and wide doors opened for either the ideally candid47 or the humanly uncandid48 disposition of the "real question" of every case upon "true grounds." Rantoul's Benthamite aim was that the personal wills and social views of judges should be reduced to innocuousness by a complete code of rules so definite and certain as to allow no loop-hole for judicial legislation. Pending codification, courts were if possible to be kept from legislating where the common law was silent or uncertain.
Consistently both with his Benthamism and with the professional conventions of the time-and also with the wise practical policy of not exciting Tory antagonisms further than was unavoidable-Rantoul relied in Commonwealth v. Hunt rather upon negation of claims that there was law against effective labor organization than upon affirmation of its social expediency. His arguments were not original. They had been 45 "Law is the command of the sovereign" was the backward-looking formula, the truth of which they toiled up-hill to prove: for superior powers in society are complex, shifting, and often obscure. Jurists whose construction of Austinianism is absurdly literal find it easy to prove its absurdity; e.g. ALLEN ably presented by Franklin in 1806 and Sampson in 1810.49 They had been pressed unsuccessfully in a number of later cases. But Rantoul was probably the most powerful lawyer who has ever whole-heartedly defended an American labor case. His mind had depth and range; he inspired both liking and respect, even among those who differed with him; though he had not attained to a political position more impressive than that of minority leader in the state legislature, he was expected to.50
His first point'after he had assured the jury that they were judges of law, was that there was no law against conspiracies in restraint of trade unless common law. There should be no such common law crime; it would be too uncertain. "Man makes law for his dog"; unless it is clear and simple, the dog does not know how to behave; he is not regulated, but confused. "Misera seervitus ubi jus incertum atque vagum." That criminality should depend upon ex post facto judicial legislation may be well enough in a stationary society like that of China. It is intolerable in a society where everything is changeful.
"We have not adopted the whole mass of the common law of England, indiscriminately, nor of the English statute law." Our Constitution continues only such as had been used and approved and usually practised before its adoption-only such, moreover, as suits the condi- tions of a free people who have thrown off monarchy and the class discriminations that go with it. "We might as well be governed by England as to adopt blindly in mass her laws which grow out of her institutions and state of society." Her government is founded upon property. Her laws restraining laborers from interfering with trade sacrificed them to the ruling classes. "Laws against acts done in restraint of trade belong to that portion of the law of England which we have not adopted. They were part of the English tyranny from which we fled. They are repugnant to the Constitution and to the first principles of freedom."51 His further more technical arguments as to the law of conspiracy and criminal pleading, though they made no impression upon the trial court, were to such an extent adopted by Chief Justice Shaw, whose opinion will be discussed later, that they will not be stated at this point. He addressed the jury for two solid days, doubtless with warmth and color of which but few traces survive in his notes or the summaries in the printed reports. It seems fair to conclude, however, that most of what he said was better adapted to the understanding of an appellate court than a jury. The friendly Boston Post made no attempt to convey any of his points to the public, saying only that his argument was "most elaborate. ... As a review of the English laws respecting the working classes, it was one of the most instructive arguments ever made in Boston." The judge commenced his charge with the remark that the jury's patience had already been "well disciplined." The district attorney commenced his closing argument by characterizing Rantoul's speech as suitable for a lecture hall or legislature; small part had any bearing on the case; but "a certain mystification has been thrown over it which I will try to disperse."52 It does not appear that Rantoul tried directly to counteract the emotions which were likely to defeat him-sympathy with bootmakers who had to join or quit their jobs, and with masters who were forced to acquiesce; fear of labor tyranny. The district attorney and the judge, on the other hand, probably succeeded in heightening these emotions. When the introduction of machinery gave rise to trade unions in England, said the district attorney in his opening, "the utmost energy of the government was required for the preservation of the laws and the protection of the community." Such prosecutions as this are not new. The tailors of Cambridge were convicted in 1721;53 there have 5 The above is taken mainly from the notes Rantoul used in making his argument, which consist of eight formulated propositions with a mountain of citations under each; his more technical arguments are adequately summarized in the reports, supra note 7. been many cases in this country, especially in New York.54 But there has been no difficulty in suppressing trade unions, "for their spirit is anti-republican, and public sentiment has aided the law in checking the mischief. .. . What can be more tyrannical than for the journeymen of any trade to combine and take preventive measures, that no man shall be employed in their trade, unless he pays them for admission into their society, and submits to their dictation and rules? No choice is allowed. There is absolute and over-bearing compulsion." It is true that lawyers have had bar rules, and physicians their tariff of fees. "But one conspiracy is no justification for another." When trade union societies began to be in vogue in Massachusetts, moreover, the Suffolk Bar set the good example of abolishing their rules regulating fees.55 The bootmakers' society "may have some good objects, and do some good, . . . but it is oppressive . . . and intended so to be-a coercive, rigid, persecuting society." In this particular it differs from the bar and medical societies.56 Judge Thacher's emotional appeals were less restrained: "You may have perceived in this case, as in other secret societies, the strength of the spirit of the society." Members were unwilling witnesses against it. But its constitution speaks for itself, and cannot be contradicted.57 "You must judge whether they do not propose, by means of this league, to control all masters, journeymen, and apprentices in their art; and to compel the people of the commonwealth to pay for their boots and shoes whatever price this society shall set." If they are held justified in law, "they will probably make new and still more burdensome regulations." And masters, under equal protection of law, will combine and oppress journeymen, till ultimately every profession, trade, and occupation will be "disfranchised of their ancient . . . rights and liberties, and subjected to new, secret, and unknown tribunals, and to varying laws by which their property will be taken from them against their consent, and without trial by jury." "The question is not whether the society have used their power to the extent of mischief of which it is capable, but rather whether they have not assumed a power . . . which in the hands of irresponsible persons, is liable to great abuse." If such associations should become general, "all industry and enterprise would be suspended, and all property would become insecure. It would involve in one common, fatal ruin, both laborer and employer, and the rich as well as the poor. It would tend directly to array them against each other, and to convulse the social system to its centre. A frightful despotism would soon be erected on the ruins of this free and happy commonwealth."58 Of course all this had a sub-structure of assertion as to the law. The jury's right to judge the law was conceded. They must do it upon evidence, however-expert evidence, since they cannot be expected to read "the hundred law books produced on each side." The court is the constitutional witness; they should not rely upon other testimony than his.59 The common law is as certain as statute law. That of this commonwealth rests not only upon that of England but also upon cases adjudged here since the Revolution. Our supreme court "have decided that conspiracy is an offence at common law, as adopted in Massachusetts, and by this decision and that of this court you must abide." The object of a conspiracy need not be an act criminal if performed by an individual; the conspiracy is criminal if the object is only civilly unlawful.60 "Although it was lawful for these defendants, individually, to refuse to work for any master bootmaker who should employ a journeyman not a member of their society, yet if they combined together to control, by the force of numbers, the employment of other persons, or to extort from any one the payment of sums of money not justly due, I consider that both the means and the object were violations of law." They usurp governmental power. And that is unlawful; for the Constitution provides "that every individual in this commonwealth has a right to be protected by the government in the enjoyment of his property, according to standing laws." Their fines are taxes; and only the legislature may lawfully tax. "It is my duty to instruct you, as matter of law, that this society of journeymen bootmakers, thus organized for the purposes described in the indictment, is an unlawful conspiracy against the laws of this commonwealth."61 After the verdict of guilty, imposition of sentence was deferred until the Supreme Judicial Court should have ruled upon Rantoul's exceptions. That court found it unnecessary to pass upon three of the four exceptions,62 since it sustained the fourth. The exception sustained was to the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury, 58 THACHER, at 647, 650-654. 59 Id., at 636, 640. 60 Id., at 640-642, citing cases in 1803 of conspiracies to commit civilly actionable frauds which were not then indictable.
61 Id., at 644-5, 648, 649, 650, 653. 6a Exceptions not passed upon were to permitting witnesses to state conclusions of compulsion, supra note 27, to the exclusion of evidence of the cost of living, supra note 33, and to the exclusion of evidence that Home was habitually slack as a workman, supra note 22.
"that the indictment did not set forth any agreement to do a criminal act, or to do any lawful act by any specified criminal means, and that the agreements therein set forth did not constitute a conspiracy indictable by any law of this commonwealth."3 Chief Justice Shaw's opinion was a consummate fusion of considerations of social advantage with technicality, adopting, with subtle modifications, all of Rantoul's contentions as to the law of conspiracy.
The common law of Massachusetts, he said, derived from that of England the rule that it is criminal to combine to do that which is unlawful or criminal. But much that was unlawful or criminal in England is not unlawful in Massachusetts. Many English rules as to laborers, both statutory and at common law, were not adapted to our conditions and are not law here. Since we have no legal limits on wages, The King v. Journeymen Tailors of Cambridge64 is not a precedent for a prosecution here of a combination with the same object. The only other reported case of the eighteenth century in which a labor combination was held indictable at common law was Rex v. Eccles.65 The indictment there charged conspiracy, by means not stated, "to deprive and hinder" a tailor from exercising his trade; the court must have deemed this object unlawful, whatever the means by which it was to be affected; it is not so here. The only American labor case which seemed to Shaw worth mentioning was People v. Fisher,66-explainable on the ground that in New York, by statute, restraint of trade is a criminal object when it is the object of a combination. Such is not the law in Massachusetts.
Shaw found his own abstract definition of conspiracy unsatisfactory. He agreed with Rantoul that the pattern conspiracy is a combination to commit a crime; the exception which his decision sustained was framed on that theory. Yet, respecting the authority of cases sustaining convictions for conspiracy to defraud or to seduce when the execution of the contemplated fraud or seduction would not have been a crime, he was forced to say that if the intended object or means, though not criminal, was unlawful, the combination might be a conspiracy. "But yet it is clear, that it is not every combination to do unlawful acts, to the prejudice of another by a concerted action, which "6 Commonwealth v. Hunt, supra note 7, 4 Metc. at 127. 48 Mod. 10 (K. B. 1721); the object of the combination was to raise wages higher than a statutory maximum. The case was badly reported or loosely reasoned; but it seems to have been held that an indictment for conspiracy to do what is unlawful by statute need not aver contra formam statuti.
65 Leach, C. C. 274 (1783), an obscurely reasoned, loose decision of Lord Mansfield's. See Nelles, supra note 1, at 197 et seq. 6Appendix, Case 16. The court in that case clearly purported to find that the statute was declaratory of the common law. is punishable as conspiracy." The line defies precise definition by words. The specific object or means must be examined to see upon which side of it a case falls.
Therefore an intended object or means that will stamp the combination a conspiracy must be specified in the indictment.67 Questionbegging pleader's conclusions will not do.68 Nor will evidence at the trial repair their insufficiency. "Whatever illegal purpose can be found in the constitution of the Bootmakers' Society, it not being clearly set fourth in the indictment, cannot be relied upon to support this conviction. So if any facts were disclosed at the trial which, if properly averred, would have given a different character to the indictment, they do not appear in the bill of exceptions, nor could they, after verdict, aid the indictment. But looking solely at the indictment, disregarding the qualifying epithets, recitals and immaterial allegations, and confining ourselves to facts so averred as to be capable of being traversed and put in issue, we cannot perceive that it charges a criminal conspiracy punishable by law."69
Having thus made a case for reversal with an old-style technical rigor which was not always characteristic of him, Shaw supplemented it with powerful argument on the merits.70 Under the indictment before him, the defendants could be punished for innocent, even laudable, acts and aims. For stripped of pleader's conclusions, the charges are two: (1) that the defendants formed a society and agreed not to work for anyone who should employ a non-member after notice to discharge him;71 (2) that their object was to impoverish Jeremiah Home and certain masters. They may have done and intended all that is charged, and yet have done or intended nothing unlawful or improper.
Their manifest purpose to induce all those engaged in the same occupation to become members of their society is not unlawful. "It would give them a power which might be exerted for useful and honorable purposes, or for dangerous and pernicious ones. 68 "This is required, to enable the defendant to meet the charge and prepare his defence, and, in case of acquittal or conviction, to show by record the identity of the charge, so that he may not be indicted a second time for the same offence."
Id., at 25-6. 69 Id., at 136. 70 Id., at 128-136.
71 Shaw recited the averment in the indictment of purpose to boycott workmen who would not pay fines levied by the Society for breach of its rules (id., at 131), but without dignifying it by discussion. association might be used to afford each other assistance in times of poverty, sickness and distress; or to raise their intellectual, moral and social condition." If, under cover of meritorious avowed objects, people associate for secret purposes "injurious to the peace of society or the rights of its members," it is undoubtedly a criminal conspiracy. Or if the leading spirits of an innocent association turn its powers to purposes of oppression and injustice, "it will be criminal in those who thus misuse it, or give consent thereto, but not in the other members." But no such criminal objects are averred.
"Nor can we perceive that the objects of this association, whatever they may have been, were to be attained by criminal means." The proposed means averred is not working for employers of non-members. Unless this involves breach of employment contracts,72 which is not to be supposed without averment, they are "free to work for whom they please, or not to work, if they so prefer. . . . We cannot perceive that it is criminal for men to agree together to exercise their own acknowledged rights, in such a manner as best to subserve their own interests." Test this by assuming an indubitably laudable object-the discouragement of intemperance-and means like that alleged-not to work for employers of habitual drinkers. Persistent drinkers would find employment hard to get or keep; employers would suffer by losing skillful but intemperate workmen. But "as the object would be lawful, and the means not unlawful, such an agreement could not be pronounced a criminal conspiracy."
It was averred in one of the counts that "by means of said conspiracy, the defendants did compel one Wait to turn out of his employ one Jeremiah Home." If this could be construed as averment of an intended object or means,73 the question would be of the construction of the word "compel." It sometimes means "coercion, or duress, by force or fraud." With a context of averments of intended force or fraud, 72"The case supposes that these persons are not bound by contract. . . . We do not understand that the agreement was, that the defendants would refuse to work for an employer to whom they were bound by contract . . ; nor that they would insist that an employer should discharge a workman engaged by contract for a certain time, in violation of such contract. ...
If a large number of men, engaged for a certain time, should combine together to violate their contract, and quit their employment together, it would present a very different question. Suppose a farmer, employing a large number of men, engaged by the year, at fair monthly wages, and suppose that just at the moment when the crops were ready to harvest, they should all combine to quit his service, unless he would advance their wages, at a time when other laborers could not be obtained. It would surely be a conspiracy to do an unlawful act, though of such a character, that if done by an individual, it would lay the foundation of a civil action only, and not of criminal prosecution. It would be a case very different from that stated in this count." Id., at 130-1.
3 He thought it could not; if no criminal object is distinctly averred, inference from averments of overt acts cannot supply the defect. Id., at 132. "especially if it might be fairly construed . . . that Wait was under obligation, by contract, for an unexpired term of time, to employ and pay Horne,"74 compel might have that meaning. But the word "is disarmed and rendered harmless by the precise statement of the means, by which such compulsion was to be effected. It was the agreement not to work for him, by which they compelled Wait to decline employing Horne longer."
As to counts stating the defendants' object as "to impoverish" Horne or Wait by unstated "indirect means,"75 but little need be added. Suppose a baker had the exclusive custom of his village, and was making large profits; and some of his customers, when he would not reduce prices, set up a competing bakery. "The effect would be to diminish the profit of the former baker, and to the same extent to impoverish him. And it might be said and proved that the purpose of the associates was to . . . impoverish him. . . . The same thing may be said of all competition in every branch of trade and industry; and yet it is through competition that the best interests of trade and industry are promoted." An association whose object is to adopt measures which may tend to impoverish is not criminal unless its contemplated measures are criminal or unlawful.
These were the points of Shaw's opinion. Rantoul might have been dissatisfied with much that he said. Shaw was careful, it will have been noted, to leave open various doors through which, should occasions arise, law could move to break effective labor organizations. Yet the main points which earlier counsel in American labor cases had pressed in vain seemed established for good and all: that special unlawfulnesses peculiar to labor organizations were not to be transplanted from England, and that whatever one person may lawfully do, any number may lawfully undertake, even if the result is to maintain the closed shop. These points were indeed regarded as established from 1842 until after the Civil War. the negligence of a switchman, the railway company which employs both is not liable. Such a rule, he argued, "is founded upon the expediency of throwing the risk upon those who can best guard against it." It will make for the protection of both the public and fellow workmen from injuries due to workmen's negligence. For, knowing that they cannot get compensation if injured, engineers, for example, will quit their jobs rather than work on the same railway with a careless switchman. Railways will discharge careless switchmen to prevent this. Therefore switchmen will be careful. Whatever the legal consistency of letting workmen help themselves against fellow servants in one case, and against employers and competing cheap labor in the other, inconsistency between the two cases is at least as obvious from a Jeffersonian point of view.
III
Shaw, though gruff, was a tender-hearted man.77 But he had no more liking for democracy or respect for the common man than Hamilton or Webster. At a time when an intelligent Jeffersonian could reasonably hope that juries would continue to correct judicial biasses and rigidities often and importantly enough to outweigh their frequent imbecilities, Shaw contributed greatly to depriving jury service of dignity and responsibility.78 Neither his greatness nor his conscientiousness as a judge is open to the slightest question. His conscience was Tory. The constituency to which his sense of obligation was keenest comprised State Street and Beacon Hill, the bankers, the textile manufacturers, the railway builders. With most of that constituency, he had shifted from Congregationalism to Unitarianism79-of the safe and sane variety which looked askance at the audacious social and religious views of Emerson and Theodore Parker.80 He was often bitterly denounced by radicals. For example Richard Henry Dana, whose abolitionist fervor laid him open to retort in kind, described Shaw as "a man of intense and doting biases in religious, politicial, and social matters."81 Though he spoke respectfully of "liberty," he was one of many judges who have found in "license" strict limits to the scope of that flexible concept. Abner Kneeland's "blasphemy" seems to have been an honest and sober open to what was going on in the world; he was impatient of narrow legalism, well though he could use it; he wanted law to promote fair dealing in business transactions; he wanted enterprise to prosper; he was sagaciously alert to promote these and other interests which seemed to him to be those of the supposed entity called "society." Holmes wrote of him: "The strength of that great judge lay in accurate appreciation of the requirements of the community whose officer he was. Some, indeed many, English judges could be named who have surpassed him in accurate technical knowledge; but few have lived who were his equals in their understanding of the grounds of public policy to which all laws must ultimately be referred."86 Holmes himself owes much to him. Shaw anticipated him, for example, when he said: "In considering the rights and obligations arising out of particular relations, it is competent for courts of justice to regard considerations of policy and general convenience." The context in which Shaw said this, however, distinguishes him from Holmes-whose Toryism is greatly modified, much as John Adams' was, by Jeffersonian values. It was said as preface to Shaw's argument of the sound policy in the fellow servant rule.
For all the meagreness of the bill of exceptions filed in his court, Shaw undoubtedly knew all that was worth knowing about the trial of Their game might well have seemed not worth the candle. Relations between the organized bootmakers and their employers were harmonious. If a few employers did not like the journeymen's society, there were more who did. None of them thought that union wages were too high or that union workmen were unsatisfactory. There had been no strike or threat of strike-no serious labor trouble or indication of its likelihood. Of all the cases in the history of labor law in which the nominal complainant has been an aggrieved workman, Commonwealth v. Hunt is the only one that occurs to me in which it seems probable that no employing interest was actively concerned.87
In the depression of the early forties, to organize labor in any important industry in Massachusetts would have been as impossible as for an existing organization to undertake an aggressive policy. Even in the middle thirties Massachusetts employers had feared the trades' union movement with less reason than employers elsewhere. The Middle States had been the main field of that wave. Manured by the currency inflation,88 local societies of journeymen in particular skilled 87 In several of the earlier cases it is certain, and in all the rest it seems likely, that prosecution was instigated by employers, often organized for that purpose and engaging distinguished counsel. See Appendix.
8 Superabundant money, even such as it was, meant rising prices, brisk business, and increased demand for labor; therefore opportunity for workmen in the skilled trades, if they could get together, to raise their wages (though probably not in proportion to the increased cost of living), and incidentally to strike blows trades had sprung up like mushrooms. At New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, New Brunswick, Newark, Albany, Troy, Schenectady and other centers local societies of many trades had somewhat fused into trades' unions-more like modern "city central" labor organizations than like modern trade unions. Backed by the newspaper organ, funds and boycotting power of a trades' union,89 a local society could usually, in the prosperous years before the Panic, weather and win its strikes. In several trades, of which the cordwainers' was one, there was also loose fusion of neighboring local societies into what aspired to be a national society of the trade.90 Such a society, though much less potent than a trades' union, could give moral and perhaps a little financial backing to local societies of the trade in places too small to have trades' unions. The terrifying though not terrible National Trades' Union had at least such existence as could be conferred by two annual conventions with published proceedings.91
It is not intended to imply that this movement did not touch Massachusetts. There was a trades' union at Boston and a good many local societies were organized. But the proportion of the laboring class which organized was much smaller than in the Middle States. The largest manufacture, by long odds, was of textiles. And then, as before and since, operatives in the textile mills were for the most part unorganizable.92 The building trades organized to some extent. But whereas, at Philadelphia, not only these trades but even the unskilled coal-heavers won after short strikes demands for a working day lasting only from six to six, with two hours out for meals,93 the Boston carpenters only added a new chapter to their history of failure-and their disastrous against practices which it had been futile to fight in the leaner years which preceded: hours from dawn to dark, prison labor, dispensing with trained men by dividing handiwork (machinery, except in the textile mills, had scarcely commenced its devastations) into separate processes which could easily be taught to women or boys. Boys, called apprentices, were counted upon to run away long before they had served their time; their use was to dispense with trained men, not to multiply them. COMMONS, at 335 ff. of mass production were usually recent graduates from the workbench.103 In the early forties they might well have regarded the Boston society with unconcern, if not with friendliness, as a peculiar isolated phenomenon which neither touched nor threatened them. The cheap labor which they required was superabundant; effective organization of it was unthinkable; if trade should improve, fresh labor stpplies could be tapped in the farmhouses, and sufficiently trained farmerworkmen brought into the shops. Thousands of people in Massachusetts, with no very sharp lines between employers and workmen, made footwear; and to consult their interests and prejudices was politically important. But feeling that the Boston society was a menace would not have been intense or general among them. Such feeling would have been more intense among those interested in the prosperity of the textile mills. Whigs generally identified that prosperity with the welfare of the Commonwealth-rightly, moreover, if such an identification was justified by the fact that nearly everyone's income was at least indirectly affected by the ups and downs of the mills. The incomes of a very large proportion of the "better element" were directly affected. Stock in the mills was no longer closely held. The founders had ploughed back into the industry the fat dividends of the first period of mechanical weaving; their great wealth (liquid in the forties and available to capitalize railways) was not immediately derived from dividends, but from unloading most of their holdings upon others of the well-to-do as over-expansion made it clear that dividends, if any, would thenceforth be moderate.104 As early as 1834 it was said that seven-eights of the merchants of Boston had direct stakes in the mills.105 The numerous stockholders were seldom free from worry lest dividends fall below nine per cent on stock for which they had probably paid a good deal more than par.106 The better the earnings, the safer the salaries of agents and executives. And the interests of other numerous groups-mill bankers and distributors of mill products, for example-were scarcely less direct. To all such any increase in labor costs might spell disaster, and labor organization, even if remote from the mills, seemed a menace. There was little over-supply of cheap labor that the mills could draw on until the wave of Irish immigration in the middle forties. The dismal lives of mill hands were a constant theme for reformers; and though the mill hands were unorganizable, attempts to organize them had not infrequently made trouble for mill managers.107
In 1840, when Commonwealth v. Hunt was tried, textile interests, enjoying a precarious moment of comparative prosperity,108 would have been anxious lest mill hands be stimulated by an acquittal of the defendants. In 1841, however, when the appeal was argued,109 Whig exultation in victory was already dampened,10 and the textile industry was depressed.1l In 1842, when, after about a year's consideration, the appeal was finally decided,1"2 the depth of depression made labor trouble in the mills unthinkable. And tariff protection, then the absorbing concern of textile interests, required workingmen's support. Any excitement of resentment among even a small group of workingmen might jeopardize the prospect of securing the desired legislation.
The situation of the textile industry was desperate. If the Democrats should completely abolish the tariffs on their staple productscoarse sheetings and shirtings-they would not be hurt. There was no longer danger of foreign competition in those products. It was domestic over-expansion and over-production which made them sell at a loss in glutted markets. The brains of the industry wanted to adapt much of its overgrown productive equipment to the manufacture of finer goods. But for this to be profitable, a tariff which would prevent the importation of such goods was essential.l3
The If such a man as Rantoul, whose basic tenet was the class struggle,127 but who could talk to Gloucester fishermen in language which drew an approving letter from John Marshall,128 and who, as Democratic leader in the Massachusetts legislature in the later thirties, had, with Whittier's help, blocked many cherished schemes of the Whig majority29--if such a man were given the bootmakers' case to take into politics, the repercussions upon the campaign for tariff protection might be disastrous. The result expected from protection, prosperity, could be trusted to dissolve radicalism.130 During depression it would not have been sensible to risk further excitement of uneasy minds and consciences by declaring the criminality of an actually inoffensive labor union in a case with which no important interest was in fact deeply concerned. to demand and obtain some measures in alleviation. Van Buren, by executive order, had established the ten hour day for federal employees in 1840.131 On March 3, 1842, the legislature of Massachusetts made it unlawful to employ children under the age of twelve in the mills for more than ten hours a day.132 Since experience had shown that small children were not usually worth their sixty-seven cents a week, this legislation was objectionable to textile interests only upon principle.
There can be no question but that Shaw's holding that a labor organization could lawfully compel employers and independent workingmen to comply with its regulations was similarly objectionable. But Shaw, sure that he knew better the best interests of the textile industry than mill stockholders themselves, was not the man to invite trouble for the sake of a sterile rag of principle. Unradical though he was, he was not the sort of unradical, latterly common in Massachusetts, whom Anatole France might have called, as he did Cicero, "a Moderate of the most violent description." Shaw was level-headed.
He was at pains therefore to convey to textile interests that they need not fear increased danger of labor organization in the mills as a result of his decision. Several times in his opinion he went out of his way to iterate that a combination to break contracts of employment, or to induce their breach, would be criminal.133 Mill labor, though subject to lay-off if business became slack and to discharge virtually at will, was customarily employed by contract, often in writing, for a year's work. In the girl-power mills, the operators agreed to remain with the company for twelve months at fixed rates of wage, to live in the company boarding houses, to observe whatever might be the company's regulations, to attend public worship, not to drink or smoke, and not to organize or strike on pain of forfeiture of wages (which were payable not oftener than monthly).134 may have been the "real question" in that case and the "true grounds" of the decision, the case was taken at face value as meaning that workmen could lawfully do in combination any act that they could lawfully do individually, and there were but few resorts to law to restrain effective trade unionism in the ensuing twenty years. It does not appear that any labor case in that period was fought through to a finish.135 In spite of this wide gap in the long line of labor cases, Dr. E. E. Witte, whose opinions are always entitled to respect, says that Commonwealth v. Hunt "seems to have had comparatively little effect upon the development of the law of labor combinations; . . . that there were not more such cases [in the next twenty years] is readily explained by the almost complete absence of strikes."'36 But that there were not more strikes (Commons estimates that there were four hundred in 1853-1854)137 may be as readily explained by the probability that a good many employers, on the advice of counsel to whom few names were as great as Chief Justice Shaw's, put up with labor unions which, had Commonwealth v. Hunt gone the other way, the law would have been invited to crush. After prosperity arrived in the fifties, trade unions became stranger and more numerous than at any earlier time,'38 and no comparable period has such a record of non-resort to the courts against their activities.
IV
With another opinion of Dr. Witte's I agree entirely: that the law and labor situation prior to Commonwealth v. Hunt has been misrepresented by most of the few writers who have given attention to it. The impression is abroad that medieval legal doctrines had been enforced against labor unions with medieval ferocity. The facts are that the basic doctrine19 was one which has sharpened its teeth in the modern injunction era; that, though nearly all the cases were criminal prosecutions, in none "was a single workman sentenced to jail, and only in the New York tailors' case were heavy fines imposed"; and that we have record of only nine convictions as against four acquittals.140 Throughout the period before the Civil War the power of Jeffersonianism was tremendous. There would have been more cases otherwise. And when Toryism pressed and won an occasional case, its moderation in victory was well advised.
Though the long run tendency of cyclical depressions and prosperities in the forties and fifties was to nourish Toryism, Americans remained for the time being preponderantly Jeffersonian.l41 It was to what came as near to a Golden Age as our democracy has enjoyed, that Shaw's decision contributed.
In many of its aspects this not-very-near Golden Age was unlovely. The common man held the center of the stage, bowing his head to none. If he did not see himself beautiful as Narcissus, he wore his ugliness with complacency. The cult of the Hamiltonian bitch-goddess, Success, was embraced by Jacksonians foul with tobacco juice, who stripped it of decencies that had been dear to the old Federalist aristocracy. Fineness of living had often either to hide in corners or be ostracized for its idiosyncrasy. "The society around Poe had no more use for an architectural imagination than the Puritan had for decorative images; the smoke of the factory chimney was incense, the scars on the landscape were as the lacerations of a saint, and the mere multiplication of gaunt sheds and barracks was a sign of progress and therefore an earnest of perfection."'42 The Jefferson who solaced himself with a violin and built the University of Virginia would surely not have found this society excellent.
Yet he might have found it on the whole better than most othersbetter, for instance, than a society in which Tory interests would not have needed public relations counsel of the calibre of Webster and Clay. For there was another side to the picture. If even in the best of times the life of the common man was arduous, nevertheless at all times he could live relatively well. In depressions the poorest and worst hit were safe from starvation. The Lynn shoemakers "were able to weather repeated depressions in their trade because they were more than shoemakers. They were citizens of a semi-rural community. Each had his own garden, a pig and a cow. They were fishermen, more or less, and during a spell of depression in the shoe trade they could keep alive, at 1 The short-hand description of social conflict as between Toryism and Jeffersonianism may both invite and deserve adverse criticism. The conflict might more accurately be described as many-sided. But the simple antithesis seems useful, and more complex analysis superfluous.
The conflict should not be represented as between altruistic principles to the exclusion of dumb animal appetites. Principles are often enough mere window dressing. It is intended, perhaps unsuccessfully, that the words Tory and Jeffersonian shall convey the whole body of opposing wants, wants for more money and more food as well as wants to live in a good or best possible society. least, on sea-food, pork, and garden truck."143 Though in the forties and fifties these conditions were changing, so long as land in the industrial regions was generally under cultivation, for food rather than for money crops, the unemployed artisan or day laborer could earn his living, even without going West. He was not helplessly dependent upon a machine which at any moment might cease to need him. Between laborers, mechanics, small merchants and professional men the gaps were narrow. All were rather generally persons of some consequence. They counted. Work was more often congenial than under later conditions; in spite of increasing production of shoddy wares, there was more chance for satisfaction in workmanship and in the social intercourse of the job. tion of eleven weavers to instruct unskilled hands. At the first trial, August, 1834, the verdict was for the defendant. On re-trial in the Superior Court a month later the jury disagreed. At the third trial, January, 1836, there was evidence that pickets had met all arriving boats during the strike, and a few arriving weavers had left without applying for jobs, in some instances after receiving a dollar or so from the strikers to pay their fares. The strikers had hissed and spit at a weaver who, after his arrest in the action, had gone back to work on the company's terms. The court charged that the combination of the men was lawful if their intention was merely to withhold their own labor until their conditions were met, unlawful if the intent was to coerce the company by interruption of its business. Verdict was for the defendant.
15. Taylor v. Thompsonville Carpet Manufacturing Co., Connecticut, 1834-1837, Supplement to 4 Doc. HIST. 15. In 1834, after the second trial of the preceding case, Taylor, a defendant therein, sued the company for malicious institution of the action and malicious arrest in it. The County Court overruled a demurrer to his declaration. The company removed the case to the Superior Court, where it lay inactive until February, 1837, when, with other similar actions, it was discontinued.
16. People v. Fisher, New York, 1835, 14 Wend. 2. The indictment charged that the defendants, journeymen shoemakers employed by one Lum at Geneva, N. Y., agreed that coarse boots should not be made for less than $1.00 a pair; that any journeyman making such boots for less should be fined $10.00, and that until his fine was paid no journeyman should work for any master who gave him work; that in August, 1833,. one Pennock made a pair of coarse boots for Lum for seventy-five cents and refused to pay the fine, and the defendants compelled Lum to dismiss Pennock by refusing to work until he did so.
A decision below sustaining a demurrer was reversed by the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Savage reasoned as follows: "Without any officious or improper interference on the subject, the price . . . will be regulated by the demand for the manufactured article and the value of that which is paid for it; but the right does not exist to enhance the price of the article, or the wages of the mechanic, by any forced or artificial means." The mechanic "may say that he will not make coarse boots for less than one dollar per pair, but he has no right to say that no other mechanic shall make them for less. ...
If one individual does not possess such a right over the conduct of another, no number of individuals can possess such a right. All combinations therefore to effect such an object are injurious, not only to the individual particularly oppressed, but to the public at large. In the present case, an industrious man was driven out of employment by the unlawful measures pursued by the defendants, and an injury done to the community, by diminishing the quantity of productive labor, and of internal trade."
The indictment was under a provision of the N. Y. Revised Statutes of 1829 including among criminal conspiracies "conspiracy to injure trade or commerce," without definition. The court considered the statute as continuing a common law crime, not as creating a new one.
Whether, after the Supreme Court's decision, the case was tried below is unknown. The staleness of the controversy-the first indictment had been found in November, 1833-makes it likely that it was not. But the decision was given wide publicity, and had its bite in the next case.
17. Twenty Journeymen Tailors, New York City, 1836, 4 Doc. HIST. 315. Three months after a successful strike for higher wages, the tailors struck again, in January, 1836, to enforce compliance with a demand that the masters post on slates "the names of their journeymen as they successively took out their jobs; no one was to take a job out of his turn, and no one to have a second job until all had been supplied." Squads of 8 to 15 pickets paraded all day before the struck shops, "often spreading their cloaks and coats before the windows to darken them, insulting, vilifying, and applying the most opprobrious epithets to the journeymen who continued in employ; dignifying them with the name of 'dungs'; following and intercepting their movements when they went away with jobs, and threatening them with violence unless they struck, quit work and joined them. These acts of outrage and insult continued for nearly or quite three months, . . . to the great loss and detriment of employers, the frequent disturbance of the peace, the collection 'of tumultuous assemblages, the alarm of many who were timid." The Journeymen Tailors Society was backed in the strike by the Trades' Union.
Twenty journeymen were tried for conspiracy to injure trade and commerce. They were also indicted "for riot, and assault and battery, etc."; but it does not appear that these indictments were ever tried. The charge of Judge Edwards, following People v. Fisher, supra Case 16, treated the Society as criminal irrespective of the alleged violence and disorder; the defendants' offence was complete when they acted, however moderately, pursuant to agreement not to work for any master who employed men below their rates or otherwise violated their requirements. "It would be for the jury to say whether any body of men could raise their crests in this land of law, and control others by self-organized combination."
The jury found the defefdants guilty, recommending clemency. The court fined one $150, another $100, and the rest $50 each, in all $1,150 which was paid at once by subscription. A court officer contributed three weeks' pay to the fund.
Judge Edward said in passing sentence: "In this favoured land of law and liberty, the road to advancement is open to all, and the journeymen may by their skill and industry, and moral worth, soon become master mechanics .... Every American knows . . . that he has no better friend than the laws, and that he needs no artificial combination for his protection." Such combinations "are of foreign origin, and I am led to believe are upheld mainly by foreigners." Defendants' counsel stated that eleven of the twenty defendants were native born, two Irish, three Scottish and four English; and that five of these alien born were naturalized.
18. Hudson Shoemakers, New York, 1836, 4 Doc. HIST. 277, reprinting a pamphlet circulated as propaganda against People v. Fisher, supra Case 16. The principal evidence for the prosecution concerned the situation as between the complaining witness, a "boss" named Mosier, and the local Journeymen's Society. Mosier undertook to reduce wages below the Society's scale. His men struck. Mosier offered to pay sixpence more than the Society's prescribed minimum; but he could get no men because he would not pay a fine of $25.00 imposed by the Society for reducing wages. A travelling job-hunting journeyman left town without taking work from him because he "was told he was s scabbed boss" and "did not want to disturb the Society."
The prosecution relied upon People v. Fisher. The defendants offered no evidence. Their counsel, John W. Edmonds, after attacking the English cases and People v. Fisher, anticipated the economics of the next century in his argument: "To justify a conviction the injury must be to the trade of the whole community. Although Mosier and Shattuck may have sold less, yet other masters sold more. The same number were made and consumed . ... I cannot comprehend hoy an injury to the trade of one part and a corresponding benefit to another part, can operate to the injury of the whole. . . . Nor can I see the great danger which some anticipate from these combinations. If the mechanic gets more pay, I can see how we, who are not mechanics, have more to pay. We may become poorer, but he will be just so much the richer-yet I can see no diminution from the aggregate wealth of the community. It appears to me that the thing, if let alone, will regulate itself. If the journeymen tailors, by means of their combinations, get the prices of their work so high that we cannot afford to pay them, we shall not go without clothes, we shall make them ourselves as you do now and for the same reason, because it is our interest to do so. Nor will our whole city be without bread, because the journeymen bakers are extravagant in their demands. We will make it ourselves, as many of us do now. If they persist in their extravagance, they must either starve from their obstinacy, adopt some other calling, or retrace their steps until they find the proper level with other things in the community. If the farmer raises the price of provisions, the mechanic will raise the price of his fabrics, and thus the whole matter will regulate itself. The mischief is, when everything else is enhanced in value, that you will attempt to keep any one class down to old values, and thus exclude them from a just participation in the general prosperity."
The charge of the court was seemingly for conviction: "Heretofore all combinations of this nature have been deemed unlawful"; such proceedings as the defendants' strike home to the feelings; in a case parallel with this [People v. Fisher] the Supreme Court decided the statute was violated. But it was left to the jury to say whether the controlling of labor "in this manner" had a tendency to injure trade. And they were told that it was their duty to judge of the law, and if they "were willing to assume the responsibility and say that the Supreme Court was wrong, they had a right to do so."
They did so, finding the defendants not guilty. And on the title page of the pamphlet publication of the record, the case is described as one "where Twelve Patriotic Jurymen set aside by their verdict the decision of Chief Justice Savage, thus rescuing the rights of the Mechanics from the grasp of Tyranny and Oppression."
19. Philadelphia Plasterers, 1836, 4 Doc. HIST. 335. It seems that two plasterers refused to work for their employer while he employed the complaining witness. Recorder Bouvier charged the grand jury which found the indictment that though "the law permits individuals to value their own services at their arbitrary will, . . . the moment the combination is formed for the purpose of controlling others, . . . it becomes illegal." A report in a labor paper says that the complaining witness, "having been convinced of his folly," abandoned the prosecution; "in this dilemma, Mr. Todd, the Attorney General of the State . . . seeing, as he said, an 'immense principle' involved . . . became the responsible prosecutor." It quotes the Public Ledger as saying that at the trial Mr. Todd displayed "one talent, in which he was certainly preeminent; we mean the talent of vituperation." For the defendants' David Paul Brown "exhibited the insignificance of the charge, and the want of sense and judgment manifested in the language of the indictment, which charged the defendants with having driven away (by doing nothing) Mr. Cowperthwaite's 'hands.' " Charles J. Ingersoll, also for the defendants, "illustrated his position with numerous instances": a faithful, honest, industrious colored woman in his employ "unfortunately had a violent temper, and the consequence was that oftentimes the other servants had come to him and said they would not stay in the house if he kept her, and many had left because she was retained; and would the Attorney General, he asked, indict all these people?" The defendants were acquitted. 20. Philadelphia Coal-Heavers, 1836, newspaper items summarized, COMMONS, at 377. "During a parade of some 200 or 300 coal-heavers who were on strike for a 25 cent increase in their daily wages, several were arrested for rioting. . . . The mayor, it was said, in fixing bail [$2,500 each] declared that he was determined 'to lay the axe at the root of the Trades' Union.' This threat, together with the excessive bail, aroused the Union to action.. . .
For the first time it admitted unskilled labourers to membership and appointed a committee 'to procure counsel.' A writ of habeas corpus was secured and the labourers were brought before Judge Randall's court for examination. The examination lasted several weeks. 'The Coal Speculators brought up all their forces, and several of the respectable gentlemen came themselves to testify against the labourers,' but the court finally decided 'that there was no evidence of a breach of the peace.' The coal dealers then sought to bring charges of conspiracy against the labourers, but here again the court denied that there was ground for an indictment." ADDED NOTE to be read in connection with note 114a, supra. While this article was in press I learned through Professor Norman Ware of a pamphlet "Proceedings" of the Shoe and Leather Convention, and examined the copy presented to President Tyler, Cong. Lib. HF 2651 B 85 C 7. It is illuminating of the state of tariff feeling which Shaw must have sensed. The convened shoe manufacturers, purporting to speak also for operatives between whom and themselves there was "no great or invidious distinction . . . which God grant may always be the case," were unanimous in desire for higher duties. There was hot objection to concession in the resolutions that international free trade would be ideal; Amasa Walker supported the concession on principle; Ebenezer Hussey said that "it meant little or nothing"; that free trade is "safe for us to talk about in the abstract, for there is no danger that other nations would ever meet us on that common ground." Abbott Lawrence's advocacy of protection was enthusiastically received. The memorial to Congress disowned the principle of protection, representing revenue as the object of the specific duties asked for, and claiming that they would operate as a tax on luxuries, barely, if at all, affecting common articles. Rantoul in his speech guardedly conceded that in fixing duties for revenue a sensible Congress would put them where they would do the most good. He avoided offence to the convention by avoiding the subject of tariff protection; protection he was for-through a sound currency, which would prevent such over-expansion of manufactures and glut of importations as an inflated currency stimulates.
Rantoul's presence indicates that his defence of the Boston bootmakers had made him influential in the trade generally. The motion to invite him "to take a seat in the convention" had an effect as of saying "check" to the similar invitation to Abbott Lawrence.
